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THE ILLUSORY RIGHT TO ABANDON
Eduardo M. Peñalver*
The unilateral and unqualified nature of the right to abandon (at
least as it is usually described) appears to make it a robust example
of the law’s concern to safeguard the individual autonomy interests
that many contemporary commentators have identified as lying at
the heart of the concept of private ownership. The doctrine supposedly empowers owners of chattels freely and unilaterally to
abandon them by manifesting the clear intent to do so, typically by
renouncing possession of the object in a way that communicates the
intent to forgo any future claim to it. A complication immediately
arises, however, due to the common law’s traditional prohibition of
the abandonment of land. But the problem goes even deeper. Viewed
through the lens of land, the (prospective) right to abandon virtually any form of tangible property, even chattels, is an illusion. This
is because the legal prohibition of abandoning land dramatically
qualifies the unilateral right to abandon chattels to the point of insignificance. The common law’s treatment of land is not an
anomalous restriction within a legal regime that otherwise empowers owners to freely abandon their property. Instead, the inability to
abandon land forms the foundation of a system that, among other
things, helps regulate and direct the disposition of unwanted chattels by requiring those seeking to sever their bonds of ownership to
do so in cooperation with others. Instead of asking why the common law treats land differently from chattels, the more appropriate
question to ask is why the common law exhibits such suspicion of
abandonment as a whole. Approaching the discussion of abandonment from this perspective points towards connections between the
common law of property and conceptions of ownership that view
the latter as a social practice suffused with obligation and duty.
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Introduction
In this Article, I will transform the way you think about abandonment
law. This is not just your typical law review introduction bravado. I can
make this claim with such confidence because, if you are like most people
(even most property scholars), you do not think about abandonment law
much at all. That is not your fault. This humble doctrine seems so easy that
it merits only the most passing mention in property casebooks and is ig1
nored altogether by many. It has received similar treatment from
contemporary property scholars, generating only two articles dedicated to
2
the topic in the past seventy years. I hope to demonstrate that the doctrine
of abandonment is both more complex and significantly more interesting
than its relative scholarly neglect suggests.
In a first-year property curriculum that is full of difficult concepts, arcane rules, and seemingly anachronistic distinctions, the law of
abandonment stands out for its clarity. Simply put, the law is said to empower owners of chattels to abandon them by unambiguously manifesting
the intent to do so (most typically by physically abandoning possession of
the object in a way that communicates the intent to forgo any future claim to
3
it). At first glance, the unilateral and unqualified nature of the right to abandon appears to make it a robust example of the common law’s concern to
safeguard the individual autonomy interests that many contemporary commentators have identified as lying at the heart of the concept of private
4
ownership. For these theorists, private ownership is, at its core, the space of
1. See A. James Casner et al., Cases and Text on Property 91 (5th ed. 2004); Jesse
Dukeminier et al., Property 106, 793–96 (6th ed. 2006); Joseph William Singer, Property
Law 92–97 (4th ed. 2006).
2. See James W. Simonton, Abandonment of Interests in Land, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 261 (1930);
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 355 (2010).
3. See Long v. Dilling Mech. Contractors, 705 N.E.2d 1022, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)
(discussed in Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 392–94).
4. Libertarian and “classical liberal” property theorists in particular have frequently argued
that the common law robustly protects negative liberty, particularly the right to exclude. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, Takings 57–62, 65 (1985) (“[E]ach person can do with his own land what he
pleases so long as he does not physically invade the land of another.”). Epstein refers to himself as a
“classical liberal,” as opposed to libertarian, property theorist, because he thinks private property
rights can be overcome in order to achieve Pareto superior outcomes, provided that the owner is
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negative liberty that remains when others are excluded from an owned ob5
ject. Elaborations of these exclusion theories (or “boundary” theories, as
Larissa Katz has helpfully dubbed them), tend simultaneously to stake out
both normative and descriptive positions with respect to property doctrine,
arguing that the exclusion conception of property is normatively superior
and that the common law of property by and large already incorporates and
6
reflects this understanding of ownership.
Exclusion theories of property lend themselves to the conventional account of abandonment as a robust power enjoyed by owners to unilaterally
sever their ties of ownership to things. As James Penner puts it:
It is surely part of a right to determine how a thing is to be used that one
may make no use of it at all, for evermore. One ought not to be saddled
with a relationship to a thing that one does not want, and an unbreakable
7
relation to a thing would condemn the owner to having to deal with it.

And, indeed, at first glance, the common law doctrine of abandonment as it
has traditionally been understood appears to provide good support for the
exclusion theorists’ descriptive claim that their conception of property is
already reflected in the common law.
In this Article, I will characterize the law of abandonment as a counterpoint to the descriptive component of the exclusion theorists’ project. This
goal will seem deeply counterintuitive to property scholars accustomed to
the traditional description of the right to abandon. But, when we explore
abandonment through the lens of possessory interests in land (which everyone agrees cannot legally be abandoned), we begin to recognize the right to
abandon as both more qualified and less unilateral than initially appears to
be the case. In the end, rather than exemplifying owners’ autonomy, the law
of abandonment serves as a useful example of the constant interplay between autonomy and obligation. More broadly, through its operation on

fully compensated for the nonconsensual loss of his property rights. See Richard A. Epstein, Decentralized Responses to Good Fortune and Bad Luck, 9 Theoretical Inquiries L. 309, 316–19
(2008).
5. See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. Toronto L.J. 275,
277 & nn.6–8 (2008) (describing the “boundary approach” understanding of ownership and collecting sources). Exclusion theories of property can rest on underpinnings that are either conceptual,
see, e.g., J.E. Penner, The Idea of Property In Law (1997), or utilitarian, see, e.g., Thomas W.
Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 Yale L.J. 357,
363 (2001); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1719, 1719, 1753–90
(2004). Exclusion theories constitute a somewhat broader category than the approaches to property I
have grouped under the rubric of “property as exit,” but the two categories share a great deal. See
generally Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as Entrance, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1889 (2005). They also coincide with what Laura Underkuffler has called “property as protection.” Laura S. Underkuffler,
The Idea of Property 38 (2003).
6. See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 Va.
L. Rev. 965, 970–71 (2004) (arguing both that “nuisance law rests on a foundation of exclusionary
property rights” and that building nuisance law around such an exclusion logic is efficient because it
economizes on information costs); cf. Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77
Neb. L. Rev. 730, 740–47 (1998).
7.

Penner, supra note 5, at 79.
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land, the law of abandonment facilitates a unique role for landownership as
8
a mechanism for spreading and enforcing norms of obligation.
In Part I, I describe the broad outlines of the law of abandonment as it
has traditionally been understood, focusing on the distinction between chattels, which owners are ostensibly free unilaterally to abandon at will, and
land, for which the doctrine of abandonment is more complicated and qualified. In Part II, I revisit this apparently divergent treatment of land and
personal property. I argue that, in fact, the two are not treated as differently
as the mere statement of the applicable legal rules in Part I suggests. Viewing the law concerning the right to abandon as a unitary legal structure—
rather than in piecemeal fashion—reveals that the owner’s right to abandon
(even chattels) is largely illusory. This is because the legal prohibition on
abandoning land, when coupled with other common-law doctrines, qualifies
the right to abandon chattels almost to the point of insignificance.
My description of the law of abandonment flies in the face of the conventional understanding of the doctrine, particularly as it has been set forth
9
in scores of reported cases. But these cases, which seem at first glance to
spell out a simple and robust power of owners to abandon chattels, are not
really about the prospective rights of owners at all. Instead, they are invariably concerned with settling (after the fact) disputes about items of property
that too many people (including, frequently, the original owners themselves)
want to own. In other words, the cases do not actually seek to empower
owners to abandon their property but rather to protect subsequent possessors
of “abandoned” property from prior possessors who want to retain their
10
ownership rights.
The (re)interpretation of the law of abandonment that I propose in this
essay understands the common law’s treatment of land as the foundation,
rather than the exception, to its approach to abandonment in general. As I
will argue, the essence of the concept of abandonment—the feature that distinguishes it conceptually from a conveyance (the alternative for owners
11
seeking to rid themselves of property)—is its unilateral nature. But if this
is the case, then virtually the only property interests that owners can truly
8. See Larissa Katz, Governing Through Owners 4–5 (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author), available at http://law.anu.edu.au/news/Katz_Abstract.pdf (abstract only).
9. See, e.g., Trenolone v. Cook Exploration Co., 166 S.W.3d 495, 500–01 (Tex. App. 2005)
(“[A]bandonment means the relinquishment of the possession of a thing by the owner with the intention of terminating his ownership, but without vesting it in any one else. Abandoned personalty is
no man’s property until reduced to possession with intent to acquire title.”) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted) (quoting Gregg v. Caldwell-Guadalupe Pick-Up Stations, 286 S.W. 1083, 1084
(Tex. Comm’n App. 1926)); Terry v. Lock, 37 S.W.3d 202, 206 (Ark. 2001); Long v. Dilling Mech.
Contractors, 705 N.E.2d 1022, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“Abandonment of property divests the
owner of his ownership, so as to bar him from further claim to it. Except that he, like anyone else,
may appropriate it once it is abandoned if it has not already been appropriated by someone else.”)
(quoting Schuler v. Langdon, 433 N.E.2d 841, 842 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).
10. Each of the cases cited supra note 9 fits this pattern of parties using the law of abandonment to defend their own claim to superior rights of ownership rather than to successfully disclaim
property.
11. See Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 360 (discussing the importance of abandonment’s unilateral nature).
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12

abandon are certain incorporeal interests in land. In practice, what typically passes for “abandonment” of other forms of property are actually
bilateral acts—that is, seamless conveyances of property from one person to
another that require the consent of both.
Observing how the rule for land undermines the traditional characterization of the common law right to abandon chattels does not resolve the
frequently asked question of why the common law treats the abandonment
of land differently from chattels. It merely refines the issue. Instead of asking why the common law treats land differently from chattels, the more
appropriate question to ask is why the common law expresses such suspicion of abandonment. A consideration of this reframed question points
towards the connections between the common law and a conception of
property that views the institution of ownership as a social practice suffused
with obligation and duty. This view is at odds with conceptions of ownership that treat it as, at its core, the negative space created by the exclusion of
others from owned things, with obligations treated as deviations from that
core that stand in need of special justification.
A few caveats. I do not understand or intend this discussion of abandonment to refute exclusion theories. Nor do I mean to imply that rights of
exclusion are not a particularly important part of what it means to own private property, especially land. Instead, this Article’s aims are fairly modest.
My goal is to identify one of the boundaries of the descriptive fit (or lack of
fit) between the common law of property and the conception of property as
the negative space resulting from exclusion. Getting this right matters, because the less exclusion theories’ claims are already reflected in existing
property doctrine, the heavier the normative burden they must carry. It also
matters because of the talismanic role the “common law” of property plays
for the subset of exclusion theorists who identify themselves as “libertarians” or “classical liberals.” For these, the “common law” operates as a
baseline for determining the proper boundaries of contemporary government
13
regulation of property. Showing that the common law already imposes affirmative obligations on owners helps to resist their arguments about the
narrow scope for permissible government action.
Obviously, this Article focuses its discussion on the law of abandonment. Other corners of the common law of property must await future
efforts. But the law of abandonment constitutes an intriguing and potentially
important datum in the discussion of the common law’s understanding of
ownership, one that has been long overlooked by property theorists. Its
treatment of abandonment supports—at least incrementally—the contention
that there is significantly more going on within the common law’s (implicit)
conception of property ownership than the creation of a negative space free
from the interference of others. Viewed from the perspective of abandonment, property relationships are virtually impossible to sever unilaterally
12.

See infra Section I.B. For one (fairly trivial) exception to this, see infra note 53.

13. See Randy E. Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution 264–66 (2004); Epstein,
supra note 4, at 35–36; see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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and landownership in particular is revealed to be an obligation-laden institution through which the law can both enforce and disseminate norms of
ownership.
I. The Law of Abandonment
A. Abandonment in General
First, a clarification. It is crucial to keep two issues distinct. On the one
hand, we have behavior by owners that we colloquially call abandonment
(i.e., leaving property derelict or depositing it in garbage cans or public
places). On the other, we have the formal legal judgment that an owner has
successfully and unilaterally severed ties of ownership that previously
bound her to an item of property. My focus will be on the latter.
As for the law of abandonment, the standard hornbook rule is deceptively simple: chattels may be freely abandoned. A chattel will be deemed
abandoned when “the owner intentionally and voluntarily relinquishes all
14
right, title, and interest in it.” Important to understanding the legal concept
of abandonment, the consequence of the unilateral nature of abandonment is
that, with the exception of certain nonpossessory interests in land, abandoned property becomes, in theory, a res nullius, a thing owned by no one.
In other words, abandoned property returns to the commons. As such, the
former owner is no longer responsible for it, and it becomes available for
15
appropriation by its first new possessor.
The focus of the standard test is on the subjective intentions of the owner. And, consistent with this focus, the voluntariness of abandonment is
crucial. Evidence that an owner was tricked or induced by fraud to abandon
an item of property will defeat a claim by a subsequent possessor that it was
16
abandoned.
It is obviously difficult to determine with any certainty what is going on
inside an owner’s head. As a behavioral matter, however, the intention to
abandon is typically accompanied by observable acts that evince that underlying desire to sever a claim of ownership. The most common of these is
17
“relinquishing possession of something.” It should come as no surprise,
then, that a number of statements of the legal rule include a requirement
that, in order to abandon, an owner must physically separate himself from
the abandoned object, usually by discarding it, and that this physical separa18
tion must coincide with the requisite intent to sever ties of ownership.

14.

John G. Sprankling, Understanding Property Law § 4.03[B][1] (2000).

15.

See, e.g., Haslem v. Lockwood, 37 Conn. 500 (1871).

16. See, e.g., Lady v. Realty Assocs., 31 A.2d 875 (D.C. 1943). The Uniform Commercial
Code provides some protection for downstream, good faith purchasers of property procured through
fraud. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (2003).
17.

Penner, supra note 5, at 79.

18. E.g., 11 Thompson on Real Property § 91.07 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d ed. 2002); see
also Routh Wrecker Serv. v. Wins, 847 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Ark. 1993). The intent to abandon must
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Rather than understanding this physical separation as an essential component of the legal concept of abandonment, however, it would be more
accurate to view the intent unilaterally to terminate rights of ownership as
19
definitive of abandonment, with the legal requirement of physical relinquishment of possession serving an evidentiary or solemnizing role, much
20
as it does within the law of gifts.
The same is true of the claim, sometimes included in treatise or hornbook definitions of legal abandonment, that the act of abandonment must
21
not vest ownership of the abandoned object in any specific person. The
intention required for abandonment is one in which the owner disclaims any
further rights over the object, including (crucially, if abandonment is to be
distinguished from conveyances) the right to determine the property’s subsequent owner. Taking affirmative steps to direct the property towards
another individual undercuts the claim that the putative abandoner had the
requisite unconditional intention to abandon rather than the more conditional intention to convey the object only to a particular person or class of
people.
The law’s focus on the abandoner’s intentions, however, would seem to
mean that abandoning in a context in which the subsequent possessor can
only be one person (as occurs with the abandonment of the benefit of a servitude) should still conceivably be able to count as abandonment. A person
can engage in an act that has multiple foreseeable consequences, only one of
22
which, strictly speaking, he intends to bring about. The intent required for
abandonment is the intent to sever one’s ties of ownership, not an intent to
convey the property to a particular person. An abandoner can have that intent even in situations in which abandonment will necessarily result in an
identifiable individual acquiring the abandoned property.
B. Abandonment Distinguished
Conceptually, it is helpful to keep the doctrine of abandonment separate
from other similar, but distinct, legal mechanisms for severing ties of ownership. These fall into the broad categories of conveyances and forfeiture.
coincide with the physical separation, but the two do not need to begin simultaneously. See Thompson on Real Property, supra.
19. Cf. Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass’n v. Pulley, 869 P.2d 554, 567 (Idaho 1993)
(“Abandonment of any right is dependent upon a finding of an intent to abandon evidenced by a
clear, unequivocal and decisive act of the alleged abandoning party.”).
20. See Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in
Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 Ill. L. Rev. 341, 348–49 (1926). The importance
of the abandoner’s intent derives from the need to keep abandonment conceptually distinct from
other mechanisms of terminating ownership rights, such as forfeiture and conveyances. See infra
Section II.B.
21.

E.g., Thompson on Real Property, supra note 18.

22. This is the insight behind the famous (or, depending on your point of view, infamous)
doctrine of double effect. For a discussion of the doctrine by one of its leading supporters, see, for
example, Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward Understanding the Principle of Double Effect, 90 Ethics
527 (1980).
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1. Conveyances
Conveyances and abandonment share the requirement that an owner
specifically intend to sever the bonds of ownership. But they differ in two
ways. First, in a conveyance (e.g., a gift, sale, or devise), the conveyor’s intent to give up ownership is conditioned on the ability to direct the property
toward a particular person or group of people. The description of the intended recipient need not identify him as an individual. Rather, it can
describe the recipient generically (e.g., “my surviving children,” or “the
highest bidder,” or “first come, first served”). Second, in conveyances the
consent of the intended recipient is required for the conveyance to be completed and for the bonds of ownership to be severed. What distinguishes
abandonment as a legal concept from a conveyance is that it is a purely unilateral act, one that does not depend on the consent of any third party for its
23
completion.
Among conveyances, the doctrine whose underlying operation comes
closest to abandonment is the law of gifts. In both abandonment and gifts,
an owner gives up possession and ownership of the object without any consideration passing in the opposite direction. Traditionally, the law has
required three conditions for an owner successfully to convey property to a
donee by inter vivos gift: (1) the owner must specifically intend immediately
to convey ownership to the donee (thereby losing his own claims to the
24
gifted property and giving rise to an ownership right in the donee); (2) the
25
owner must deliver the property to the donee (a requirement whose nuances are the subject of countless cases and first-year property class
26
hypotheticals); and (3) the donee must accept the gift. The first two requirements are unilateral acts that closely resemble the law of abandonment,
with “delivery” standing in for the requirement that the abandoner forgo
possession. The requirement of acceptance, however, takes the unilateral
actions of intent and delivery and subordinates them to the recipient’s will.
As a result, the legal act of successfully giving a gift is necessarily a cooperative process that is conceptually quite distinct from the unilateral act of
abandonment.

23.

See Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 360.

24. Gruen v. Gruen, 496 N.E.2d 869, 872–74 (N.Y. 1986); Speelman v. Pascal, 178 N.E.2d
723, 726 (N.Y. 1961).
25.

Irons v. Smallpiece, (1819) 106 Eng. Rep. 467, 469 (K.B.).

26. If the item has some value, this is usually not a difficult requirement to satisfy. Indeed,
courts often presume it to be satisfied. See Scherer v. Hyland, 380 A.2d 698, 702 (N.J. 1977);
Gruen, 496 N.E.2d at 874–75. Donees might conceivably refuse even valuable gifts, however, in
order to avoid taxes or frustrate their creditors. Sprankling, supra note 14, § 5.03[D] n.27. However easily satisfied, the requirement is crucial in distinguishing gifts, which are a conveyance, from
abandonment, which is a unilateral act destroying the bonds of ownership.
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2. Forfeiture
Forfeiture and abandonment resemble one another in their unilateral operation and in the absence of an intention by the owner to direct the property
to a particular person. But in abandonment, unlike in forfeiture, the owner
must intend specifically to sever the bonds of ownership. In forfeiture, by
contrast, she merely needs to perform some other act, one consequence (and
likely an unwelcome one) of which is the loss of ownership rights. Thus, in
the forfeiture context, dispossession can take on an involuntary, punitive
dimension that is wholly alien to abandonment.
When forfeiture is accomplished by the state, it is usually the result of
some wrongdoing by the owner. It can come in either civil or criminal flavors, with differing standards of proof and procedural safeguards applicable
27
to each. Forfeiture can also result when an “owner” triggers a limitation
inherent in her title. In the context of land, for example, this might occur
where the holder of the defeasible possessory interest (say, a fee simple determinable) exceeds the scope of her rights by using the land in a way that is
expressly prohibited by the grant according to which she or her predecessors
took title. If the original grant conveyed Blackacre to A “so long as used for
residential purposes, but if it is ever used for nonresidential purposes, then it
will revert back to O,” A’s use of the property for nonresidential purposes
would have the effect of depriving A of ownership rights over Blackacre and
28
conveying them to O, or O’s successors in interest. But A’s use of the property for non-residential purposes is not, strictly speaking, abandonment. As
with forfeiture to the state, the dispossession operates independently of A’s
intentions and often occurs against A’s wishes.
Whereas both forfeiture and abandonment result in a unilateral severing
of the bond between an owner and her property (in both cases as a result of
owner conduct), forfeiture is therefore often something that is resisted (and
29
resented) by potentially dispossessed owners. Conceptually, however, abandonment always constitutes a ratification of the owner’s intentions
unilaterally to sever ownership ties. In other words, abandonment operates
as a legal power enjoyed by owners, whereas forfeitures operate as a limita30
tion on the owner’s authority to use the property as she sees fit.
C. Abandonment of Land
The seemingly elegant doctrine of abandonment becomes significantly
more complicated when interests concerning land are brought into the
27. For a concise overview of the law of civil and criminal forfeiture, see Singer, supra note
1, at 632–35.
28.
29.
1981).

See Restatement of Property § 56 (1936).
See, e.g., Mahrenholz v. County Bd. of Sch. Trs., 417 N.E.2d 138, 140–41 (Ill. App. Ct.

30. Cf. Larissa Katz, A Powers-Based Approach to the Protection of Ideas, 23 Cardozo
Arts & Ent. L.J. 687, 716–23 (2006) (discussing the concept of “powers” within the intellectual
property context).
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picture. Most starkly, the common law flatly prohibits the legal abandon31
ment of the fee simple interest in land. A landowner who wants to sever his
ties to the land must find a willing recipient of title, someone to whom he
32
can either sell or give the parcel.
Although (like abandonment itself) simple in its statement, the rule prohibiting the abandonment of land is complicated by the sheer number of
different property interests that can be carved out of a piece of land. And,
unlike the fee simple, many of those interests can be abandoned. The doctrine is typically described as holding that no possessory interest in land
33
may be abandoned. Thus, not only can the fee simple interest not be aban34
doned, neither can a term of years. Traditionally, if a tenant abandoned a
term of years, the abandonment was deemed to be an implied offer to surrender the remaining term back to the landlord, who had the option of
35
accepting or refusing the offer.
On the other hand, most authorities agree that very narrow, nonposses36
sory interests, such as the benefit of a servitude, can be “abandoned.”
When such an interest is abandoned, it is normally understood to restore
rights to the owner of the burdened possessory estate. The fact that the benefit of this sort of abandonment necessarily accrues to the owner of the
servient parcel can make the abandonment of a servitude seem like a border37
line case of abandonment. The unilateral nature of the rejection of the
benefit of a servitude and the possibility that the abandoner does not actually intend to convey the rights to the owner of the servient estate, however,
seems to make the abandonment label the appropriate one, at least sometimes.
Although the rule concerning which property interests may be abandoned is traditionally stated in terms of possessory and nonpossessory
interests, the interests subject to abandonment also share the feature of being
narrow rights to benefit from land possessed by another. In other words, a
unilateral right to abandon goes along with property interests that are carefully defined to exclude affirmative obligations. Moreover, it is important to
remember that it is only the benefit side of a servitude that may be aban31. Cristofani v. Bd. of Educ., 632 A.2d 447, 450 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993); Waldrop v.
Whittington, 57 So.2d 298, 300 (Miss. 1952); 2 American Law of Property § 8.98, at 304 (A.
James Casner ed., 1952).
32. At least one commentator has argued that the common law does not in fact restrict the
abandonment of possessory interests in land. James Kerr’s 1895 work, A Treatise on the Law of Real
Property, asserts that “[i]t is a well-known principle of law that every owner of property, whether
personal or real, may abandon it.” 3 James M. Kerr, A Treatise on the Law of Real Property
§ 2276, at 2303 (1895). There appears to be no basis for Kerr’s unorthodox characterization of the
law, and the consensus of courts and commentators is directly to the contrary.
33.

See Simonton, supra note 2, at 263.

34.

But see Sharpp v. Stodghill, 86 S.W.2d 934, 935–36 (Ark. 1935).

35.

See Sprankling, supra note 14, at 286.

36.

See Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 7.4 (2000).

37. Strahilevitz goes even further and argues that it is not abandonment at all. Strahilevitz,
supra note 2, at 399 n.186.
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doned. (The burden side of an easement is not, properly speaking, even a
property interest.) The burden of a servitude can only be terminated with the
38
consent of the benefitted party. And the standard remedy for the failure of
the burdened property to comply with the terms of a servitude is an injunc39
tion.
Other rights related to land use that can be abandoned, including water
rights and mineral rights, follow this pattern of permitting abandonment
only where the property right consists narrowly of the right to benefit from
another’s property. In the western United States, where a number of jurisdictions follow a “prior appropriation” rule for the acquisition of water rights,
the right to obtain water is treated as a right that is severable from ownership
40
of riparian land. This intangible right to divert water from a stream is dis41
tinct from both riparian rights, which may not be abandoned, and from
ownership of individual particles of water, which ostensibly may be abandoned in the same way that any other item of personal property may be. The
law concerning the abandonment of the right to divert water from a watercourse operates more or less in the same way as the right to abandon
personal property is normally described. As the California Supreme Court
put it:
The right which is acquired to the use of water by appropriation may be
lost by abandonment. To abandon such right is to relinquish possession
thereof without any present intention to repossess. To constitute such abandonment, there must be a concurrence of act and intent, viz. the act of
leaving the premises of property vacant, so that it may be appropriated by
42
the next comer, and the intention of not returning.

As with water rights, mineral rights frequently represent not a possessory interest in land, but a narrow, intangible right to extract resources from
the land of another. And the law typically allows mineral rights to be abandoned in the same way—by giving up use or possession with a simultaneous

38. 2 Emory Washburn, A Treatise on the American Law of Real Property 317
(John Wurts ed., 6th ed. 1902).
39. There is no “efficient breach” in the law of servitudes, and traditionally, doctrines like
“changed conditions,” which permit courts to modify or terminate some servitudes that outlive their
usefulness, have not applied to many types of servitudes, most importantly easements. E.g., AKG
Real Estate, L.L.C. v. Kosterman, 717 N.W.2d 835 (Wis. 2006); see also Richard A. Epstein, Notice
and Freedom of Contract in the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1353, 1364–68 (1982); Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 70
Iowa L. Rev. 615, 652–54 (1985).
40.

Dukeminier et al., supra note 1, at 34–35.

41. 1 Samuel C. Wiel, Water Rights in the Western States § 861 (3d ed. 1911). The
abandonment of water is actually complicated by rules governing the release of surface waters
across property lines, rules that vary a great deal from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. See Singer, supra
note 1, at 128–31 (discussing the doctrines of “natural flow,” “common enemy,” and “reasonable
use”).
42. Utt v. Frey, 39 P. 807, 809 (Cal. 1895), quoted in 2 Wells A. Hutchins, Water Rights
Laws in the Nineteen Western States 258 (1974).
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intent to forego future claims to them. As with servitudes, these mineral
43
rights revert to the owner of the underlying fee simple estate.
In short, although the law governing the abandonment of property rights
related to land is complex, the general principle underlying this body of
rules is less so: narrowly defined rights to extract benefits from someone
else’s land may be freely abandoned, but otherwise, interests in land may
not be. Instead, owners of these land interests must wait for them to expire
or find someone willing to take them off their hands in a mutually consensual transaction, such as an inter vivos gift or a sale.
II. Why Is Land Different?
A. How Different Is Land?
The apparently divergent treatment of land and personal property within
the law of abandonment has, until very recently, received little sustained
attention from commentators. Blackstone discusses the abandonment of
chattels but passes over the prohibition on abandoning land without com44
ment. The few discussions of the distinction that do exist have tended to be
cursory, and they contradict one another in the explanations they offer. One
commentator has simply described the rule prohibiting the abandonment of
45
land as ancient, without attempting to explain it. A different explanation
has described the rule as preventing the confusion and conflict that might
46
result from a scramble to claim abandoned property without explaining
why this would be more of a problem for land than for chattels. A third has
discussed the need to avoid gaps in title without discussing what harm
47
would result from such gaps. Another has condemned the rule as a relic,
rooted in outdated concerns with the performance of feudal obligations by
48
tenants. Finally, in a recent and insightful discussion of the issue, Lior
Strahilevitz has argued that the rule keeps owners from doing what they
want with their unwanted land without appearing to offer any offsetting (efficiency) benefits and should therefore be discarded, at least as to property
49
that has positive market value.
I am more sympathetic to the rule than is Strahilevitz. But, before going
into the reasons why it might make sense to retain it, I want to reframe the
question. The conventional modern view is that, under the current regime,
the rule prohibiting the abandonment of land deviates from the law’s permissive treatment of the abandonment of personal property, and it is this
43.

Simonton, supra note 2, at 272–75.

44.

See 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *9–10.

45.

Simonton, supra note 2, at 262.

46.

American Law of Property, supra note 31.

47.

Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 7.4 cmt. a (2000).

48. James C. Roberton, Recent Development, Abandonment of Mineral Rights, 21 Stan. L.
Rev. 1227, 1228 n.13 (1969), cited in Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 399.
49.

Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 412–19.
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restrictive treatment of land that needs to be either justified or rejected. In
other words, permissive abandonment is the norm and the rule prohibiting
the abandonment of possessory interests in land is the anomaly. This way of
stating the question has the situation exactly backwards.
The law actually treats land and personal property far less differently
than initially seems to be the case. This is because, considered from the ex
ante point of view (an owner contemplating the actual mechanics of abandonment), the common law right to abandon chattels is largely an illusion.
Thus, it is—where it exists—the power to abandon (and not its restriction in
the case of land) that is the anomaly requiring explanation. Why this is so
requires a bit more discussion.
On the usual statement of the law, as I have already related, successfully
abandoning personal property requires an owner to simply forgo possession
of an object while, at the same time, intending to renounce all future claims
to it. As a practical matter, this means depositing the item of personal property somewhere while possessing the requisite intent. But, because of the
rule against abandoning possessory interests in land, all land, at least in the
United States, must be at least formally owned by someone, either a private
51
party or the state. The fact that all land is owned means that the owner of
an item of personal property who wishes legally to abandon it must intentionally deposit the item on some piece of owned land with an intention to
renounce future claims to the chattel. This owned land will either be her
own, or it will belong to someone else.
If the putative abandoner deposits the item of personal property on her
own land, she will still be in possession of it and responsible for it until
52
some third party voluntarily comes and takes it away. Consequently, until
someone else assumes possession of the thing, the original owner cannot
satisfy the requirement, imposed by most statements of the law, that the ab53
andoner relinquish possession. Consider what happens, for example, with
the garbage we generate in our homes or items we leave on our front lawns
50. E.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Property: Principles and Policies
521–22 (2007) (characterizing the prohibition of abandonment of land as “a little odd” and assessing various possible justifications for it).
51. It is of course possible that land might be owned by someone who is not aware that he is
the owner, perhaps as a consequence of the operation of intestacy statutes. In such cases, the doctrine of adverse possession helps, over time, to bring formal title into line with the actual people on
hand to make use of (and care for) the land.
52. This abandonment scenario does not raise the same question addressed under the rubric
of “constructive possession” by courts when there is a conflict between the finder of a chattel and
the owner of the premises where the chattel is found. E.g., Parker v. British Airways Bd., (1982) 1
Q.B. 1004; Bridges v. Hawkesworth, (1851) 21 L.J. Rep. 75 (Q.B.); South Staffordshire Water Co.
v. Sharman, (1896) 2 Q.B. 44.
53. An exception to this generalization would be wild animals indigenous to the area that the
landowner had previously captured. As long as it was not in the habit of voluntarily remaining on (or
returning to) the landowner’s land, such an animal would remain the landowner’s property only so
long as it was in his possession. If the landowner were to release such a wild animal on his own
land, the animal would be free to roam off the landowner’s property and would become unowned
property subject to appropriation by another person. See, e.g., E.A. Stephens & Co. v. Albers, 256 P.
15 (Colo. 1927). I am grateful to Rachel Moran for bringing this exception to my attention.
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free for the taking. In such cases, the termination of our ownership is not
complete until some third party willingly takes possession of the item. If no
one takes it, the garbage remains our responsibility. The same is true of unwanted items we leave on our front lawn in the hope that some passerby will
take them off our hands. Thus, these supposed acts of abandonment are actually bilateral conveyances, like gifts, though gifts where the givers identify
the donees only generically (e.g., “first come, first served”). In none of these
cases, however, does the unwanted item ever really exist as a res nullius. It
seamlessly moves from one owner to another, but always at the option of the
taker.
If an owner wishes to deposit an unwanted item on land belonging to
another, she will for the most part only be able to do so in conformity with
the wishes of the land’s owner. Depositing an unwanted item of personal
property on someone else’s land without the landowner’s consent is tres54
passing. If she wishes, the wronged landowner will be able to obtain
injunctive relief forcing the erstwhile abandoner to remove the unwanted
55
property. Similarly, depositing an unwanted item on public property in a
way that is not invited or tolerated by the state is typically prohibited by law
as littering or unlawful dumping.
While many jurisdictions have made the pragmatic calculation, at least
for small items, that the difficulty of tracking down unauthorized dumpers
(i.e., litterers) makes it cost-effective to provide waste disposal services in
the form of trash containers on city corners and the like, this is not universally the case. It is not uncommon, for example, for state parks to impose a
56
“carry in/carry out” policy regarding garbage. Moreover, when confronted
with illegal dumping of sufficient magnitude, the state sometimes opts to
identify the owner of the property and force her to retake possession of her
unwanted chattel. This is what has occurred, for example, in a number of
cases involving derelict boats. In Florida, a hot spot for unwanted vessels,
the state’s Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission is empowered to
identify the owners of derelict vessels who deposit them on state or private
land without authorization and to “notify the owner [that] he must remove
57
the vessel within five days.” The owner cannot disclaim responsibility by
54.
(2002).
55.

See, e.g., Breiggar Props., L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 52 P.3d 1133, 1135–36
See, e.g., Eno v. Christ, 54 N.Y.S. 400, 401 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1898).

56. See, e.g., Delaware State Parks Carry In—Carry Out Rules, http://www.destateparks.com/
rules/cico.asp (last visited May 24, 2010); New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,
http://www.state.nj.us/dep/parksandforests/parks/index.html (last visited May 13, 2010); Wisconsin
Department of Natural Resources, http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/LAND/parks/picnic/carryout.htm
(last visited May 13, 2010).
57. News Release, Florida Fish and Wildlife Commission, FWC removes junked, abandoned
vessels from state’s waters (Apr. 8, 2009), http://myfwc.com/newsroom/09/statewide/News_09
_X_Derelict.htm. Owners who fail to remove their vessel can be charged with a criminal violation
and required to pay the cost of the vessel’s removal. Id.; see also Fla. Stat. § 823.11(4) (2008)
(making it illegal to deposit a derelict vessel in state waters without state authorization or on private
property without the consent of the private landowner); cf. Or. Rev. Stat. § 830.909(1) (2009) (“A
person commits the offense of abandoning a boat, floating home or boathouse if the person leaves a
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saying she has abandoned the boat and that it is, as a result, no longer her
concern.
A landowner who accepts unwanted personal property may agree to do
so on a temporary basis pending the property’s acquisition by a third party.
But, under those circumstances, the personal property continues to belong to
its original owner. That owner will have to retrieve it should the landowner
change her mind if the property goes unclaimed for too long.
A landowner willing to permanently accept abandoned personal property
is likely to fall into one of two categories: someone interested in becoming
the owner of the abandoned thing itself or someone in the business of accepting unwanted property for resale or disposal. We can categorize such
businesses along a continuum based on how selective they are about the sort
of unwanted property they will accept. At the more selective end will be
those solely interested in reselling others’ unwanted property, such as thrift
or second-hand stores. These usually provide donors with extensive guidelines concerning the kinds of chattels they will accept and the condition in
which they will accept them. Typical in this regard is the Ann Arbor PTO
Thrift. Its donation policy clearly states that donations are to be left during
store hours only and that the store reserves the right to refuse any donation
that it believes will not be sellable. It asks for items falling within ten product categories and provides an extensive list of the items that it will not
accept, including, for example, “[a]nything torn, stained or dirty,” Christmas
items, summer clothing, computers, exercise equipment, box springs, and
58
many more. At an intermediate level of discrimination will be businesses
like junk yards, which both resell unwanted property and agree to store or
dispose of property for which there is not likely to be a resale market. Finally, at the extreme in terms of receptiveness to unwanted property will be
the dump, which will exercise the least discretion and may be contractually
obligated to accept all unwanted property that is not in need of special
treatment. Even the dump, however, can set limits on what it will receive
and may require dumpers to pay some fee before it will accept their un59
wanted property.
In all three of the above examples, though, the need to obtain the approval of the receiving landowner substantially qualifies the chattel owner’s
ex ante right (i.e., power) to abandon personal property. The ownership of
land puts the landowner in the position of a gatekeeper through which a person wishing legally to abandon personal property must pass. My contention
about the restraint on the ability to abandon chattels that flows from the fact
boat, floating home or boathouse on the waters of this state or upon any public or private property
except with the permission of the property owner . . . .”).
58. For the full policy, see Ann Arbor PTO Thrift Shop, http://a2ptothriftshop.org/donate.php
(last visited May 13, 2010).
59. The solid waste facility serving Tompkins County, New York, for example, will only
accept limited quantities of pesticides, and by appointment only. Other items, such as computers,
are not permitted to be disposed of with normal household solid waste, but must be recycled. For
more information on the intricate nature of the county’s permission to dispose of unwanted chattels at its solid waste facility, see Tompkins County Recycling and Solid Waste, http://
www.recycletompkins.org/products/ (last visited May 13, 2010).
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that all land is owned does not rely on an absolutist conception of a landowner’s right to exclude. The resulting limitation of the power to abandon
chattels would exist in any legal regime in which a landowner’s prerogatives
prevented chattel owners from permanently depositing unwanted chattels on
someone else’s land, even if landowners operated under substantial constraints limiting their power to exclude other activities from their land. The
restrictive system of abandonment I am describing is therefore consistent
60
with even highly qualified conceptions of landowners’ rights to exclude.
The need to secure the permission of landowners before disposing of
unwanted personal property makes most cases commonly classified as abandonment operate in reality as conveyances, either gifts or sales or, in cases
where the abandoner must pay the landowner to accept the unwanted property, reverse sales. In other words, because of the prerogatives and
obligations of landownership, true abandonment of chattels, i.e., the unilateral severance of one’s ownership ties with an item of property, is quite
exceptional.
Importantly, landowners are not free to do as they please when it comes
to accepting unwanted property from others. A landowner who is willing to
accept someone else’s property will find himself constrained by the common law of nuisance to do so only in certain ways or in certain places. As
the Supreme Court aptly put it in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., a
nuisance is the right thing in the wrong place, “like a pig in the parlor in61
stead of the barnyard.” The common law of nuisance, coupled with a
neighbor’s objection, can have the effect of prohibiting a willing landowner
from accepting someone else’s unwanted personal property when doing so
would harm the landowners’ neighbors or the public at large. Even in the
days before zoning, someone wishing to operate a junk yard in a quiet residential community, for example, would have found that the law of nuisance
62
likely deprived him of that option.
The result of this constellation of legal rules is that the common law
right of abandonment, even for personal property, is an illusion. At first
glance, it is robust—nearly absolute. But upon closer examination, it is
highly qualified, almost to the point of irrelevance. Its illusory nature de60. In Sweden, for example, landowners’ right to exclude is limited by the so-called allemansrätt, or “everyman’s right” to roam over the countryside in ways that do not damage the land,
intrude on privacy, or interfere with the uses to which the owner has chosen to put her land. See
Ariane Sains, Mushroom Mania Tests the Bounds of Allemansrätt, Europe, June 2002, at 44 (discussing how the allemansrätt permits people to enter private property for recreational purposes but
not to leave behind piles of garbage). This substantial qualification of owners’ power to exclude is
consistent with exactly the same limitations on the permanent deposit of chattels on land belonging
to another necessary to support my claims concerning the limited scope of the power to abandon
chattels.
61.

272 U.S. 365 (1926).

62. See, e.g., Brainard v. Town of W. Hartford, 103 A.2d 135, 136 (Conn. 1954). Contemporary land-use regulations impose even further restrictions on willing landowners’ ability to accept
abandoned personal property. These include zoning ordinances, solid waste permit requirements,
and countless laws concerning the proper handling and disposal of hazardous waste. These public
laws governing landowner conduct further (though indirectly) limit the options available to someone
wishing to abandon an item of personal property.
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rives from the fact that, because of the prohibition on abandoning land, all
63
land is owned by someone. There is, in the United States today, no such
thing as terra nullius on which unwanted personal property can become res
64
nullius. As a result, there is no res nullius.
But, if this is so, how and why is there a rich body of caselaw discussing
the abandonment of chattels? The characterization of so-called “abandonment” cases as standing for the prospective power of chattel owners to
abandon their property rests on a misunderstanding of the cases’ actual import. For starters, some cases that discuss abandonment actually have
nothing to do with ownership as such. This is the situation, for example,
with Fourth Amendment cases discussing whether property has been “aban65
doned.” But even abandonment cases about ownership are not really about
the original owner’s right to abandon. Often, they are conflicts between two
strangers to the object’s original title, such as the finder of the abandoned
property and some other third party, like the owner of the premises on which
66
the property is found. In these cases, relativity of title means that the status
of the property as abandoned is relevant to the outcome of the case only insofar as it makes some difference for adjudicating the dispute between the
two parties. For example, it is commonly said that, as between the finder of
property and the owner of the premises in which the property is found,
property that was intentionally left by its original owner on the premises
with the intent of returning (so-called “mislaid” property) will belong to the
owner of the premises, but the property will belong to the finder if it was
67
abandoned (or lost).

63. Again, I am not focusing here on the existence of property that is, de facto, abandoned or
derelict. Depositing unwanted personal property on a piece of land whose owner is derelict remains
unlawful, though it is unlikely to yield any penalties against the person who engages in it. This is an
important phenomenon, and one of which the law of abandonment (or, perhaps, the state’s policies
towards abandonment) should take cognizance.
64. This contention does not, of course, apply to chattels deposited or lost at sea. See, e.g.,
R.M.S. Titanic v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel, 435 F.3d 521, 532 (4th Cir. 2006) (discussing the abandonment of personal property lost at sea); Hener v. United States, 525 F. Supp. 350
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same). But, for most owners, I do not take it to be a significant qualification of my
contention that the power to abandon chattels is largely illusory to admit that one has to go offshore
in order to exercise it. The difficulty of hauling unwanted property offshore is not a universal deterrent, however. And in fact, in the late 19th century, ocean dumping was a favorite way for New York
City to dispose of solid waste. See Martin V. Melosi, Garbage in the Cities 34–35 (rev’d ed.
2005).
65. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 49 n.2 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
As in the “ownership” cases discussed below, the Fourth Amendment cases invariably involve situations in which the original owner seeks to retain ownership of the chattel. Thus, like those
ownership cases, these “privacy” cases do not clearly concern the prospective “power” of owners to
abandon unwanted chattels.
66. See, e.g., Chance v. Certain Artifacts Found and Salvaged from the Nashville, 606 F.
Supp. 801 (S.D. Ga. 1984) (dispute between finder of shipwreck and owner of land in which wreck
was embedded); Terry v. Lock, 37 S.W.3d 202 (Ark. 2001) (dispute between finder and hotel owner
over found stash of money).
67.
(1939).

See Comment, Lost, Mislaid, and Abandoned Property, 8 Fordham L. Rev. 222, 224–28
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Even in cases that involve disputes between original owners and finders,
cases whose outcomes turn directly on the question whether property was
successfully abandoned, the law of abandonment does not actually concern
an owner’s prospective right (or power) to abandon. In this context, it is
helpful to distinguish between the law of abandonment as a post hoc means
of resolving disputes over ownership and the right to abandon as an affirmative power or privilege that, from an ex ante perspective, owners enjoy over
their things. Cases decided under the rubric of abandonment where the
owner is involved are concerned with the former, not the latter. The doctrine
provides a useful mechanism for resolving disputes over ownership after the
fact, when there are multiple parties willing and able to assert responsibility
for ownership of the item. But the existence of this post hoc “settling doctrine” of abandonment in no way lifts the constraints that the common law’s
treatment of land imposes on owners’ actual prospective right to abandon
property (even chattels). That is, it does nothing affirmatively to empower
owners to unilaterally sever their ties to an item of property in the absence
of another party who wishes to accept responsibility for it.
The absence of a general prospective “power” or “right” to abandon
even chattels comes through very clearly in the example, discussed above,
68
of Florida’s treatment of derelict boats. The state’s first response to the
discovery of a derelict boat has been to require the owner to retake possession. In other words, from the state’s standpoint, the boat remains the
property of the prior owner, notwithstanding his clear expression of an intention to abandon it. Only after efforts to force the owner to retake
possession have failed, either because the owner cannot be identified or because the owner lacks the financial means to remove the boat, does the state
remove or destroy the boat itself, at which point the owner may be sent the
bill or charged with a crime. This last step is not so much a legal recognition
of abandonment as a pragmatic response to the refusal of the owner to take
responsibility for the derelict property.
To summarize, then, viewed from the ex ante standpoint of the right of
an owner eager to walk away from his ownership of a thing, the doctrine of
abandonment is a sleight of hand. And it is this ex ante power of abandonment that matters most to exclusion theorists. The doctrine purports to
empower owners with the ability to abandon unwanted property, but in fact
it does no such thing. Instead, its principal function is to determine after the
fact who owns property when the property is wanted.
B. Regulating Abandonment Through Land
To return to the question with which this Part started, Why might the
common law purport to make it easy to abandon personal property while
making it impossible for an owner unilaterally to sever his ties with his
property in land? The foregoing discussion of the ways in which, in the absence of unowned land, the inability to abandon land constrains the actual
68.

See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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exercise of the supposed power that owners of chattels enjoy unilaterally to
abandon their personal property helps to formulate the beginnings of an answer. The law may well restrict the abandonment of the title to land in order,
among other things, to regulate the abandonment of personal property.
This impact on unwanted chattels is far from the only function of the
rule prohibiting the abandonment of land. As I discuss at greater length below, we would do better to understand this role of land in regulating the
abandonment of chattels as but one example of private landownership operating as a crucial tool for the enforcement and dissemination of property
norms. But, although the rule against the abandonment of land has a far
broader import than its consequences for the power of owners to abandon
chattels, its impact on that power is palpable and is no mere accident.
With no owner to regulate dumping, unowned parcels can become magnets for unwanted personal property, shifting more of the costs of policing
such activity onto the community as a whole. Thus, the common law has a
powerful, though frequently overlooked, preference that all land has an
69
owner, whether a private party or the state. The rule against abandoning
land is only one manifestation of this preference.
The law governing ownership of land at the unstable interface between
the land and the sea reflects a similar anxiety about unowned land. The
process of accretion (whereby new material is deposited from the ocean,
extending the land farther into the sea) literally creates new land. Although
it is at least conceptually possible that the law might have treated accreted
land as unowned, the typical rule is that accreted land automatically belongs
70
to the owner of the adjacent uplands. In offering a justification for this rule,
courts sometimes note that “it is in the interest of the community that all

69. Even in civil law countries, where the abandonment of land is said to be freely permitted,
abandonment often does not necessarily result in the land being declared terra nullius, but rather in
the state’s ownership of the land. In Québec, the Civil Code makes the state the owner of abandoned
land. Civil Code du Québec [C.C.Q.] art. 936 (Can.). The same rule holds in Argentina and Chile.
Código Civil [Cód. Civ.] art. 2376 (Arg.), translated in The Argentine Civil Code (Frank L.
Joannini trans., 1917) (“All lands which, being situated within the territorial limits of the Republic,
have no other owner [are the private property of the general State or of the individual States].”);
Código Civil [Cód. Civ.] art. 590 (“Son bienes del Estado todas las tierras que, estando situadas
dentro de los límites territoriales, carecen de otro dueño.”) (Chile), translated in Civil Code of
Chile (Julio Romañach, Jr. trans., 2008) (“Lands located within the territorial limits of the country
having no other owner are state assets.”). In German law, although the state does not automatically
become the owner of abandoned land, it has the right to step in and take possession before others do
so. Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] Aug. 15, 1896, 174 § 928, translated in The German Civil Code (Simon L. Goren trans., 1994).
70. See generally 1 Water and Water Rights § 6.03(b)(2), at 6-183 to -189 (Robert E.
Beck & Amy K. Kelley eds., 3d ed. 2009) (providing background information on the law of accretion); 78 Am. Jur. 2d Waters § 315 (2002) (same). The exception is in cases of so-called “avulsion,”
where there is a sudden and dramatic shift in the shoreline due to large erosion or accretion events.
In those cases, the boundary remains at its prior location and new land created by a large, avulsive
accretion event is deemed to be property of the sovereign. 73 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 167, § 3
(2003); see also 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *261–62. In no cases, however, does the
law treat the newly created land as unowned.
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land have an owner and, for convenience [in this situation], the riparian is
71
the chosen one.”
We can also understand the law of adverse possession as, among other
things, reflecting a preference that formal ownership match the actual use of
land in order to make it more likely that there will be someone on the scene
to take responsibility for the parcel. An owner who cannot be bothered to
keep squatters off her land for the adverse possession period is likely to be
someone not actively engaged in maintaining or protecting the land in other
respects. This interpretation of adverse possession shares a great deal with
Carol Rose’s interpretation of adverse possession law as resting on a notion
72
of possession as a form of communication. Adverse possession, she suggests, “requires [the owner] to make it clear that she, and not the trespasser,
73
is the person to deal with.” “Possession as the basis of property ownership,
then,” Rose continues, “seems to amount to something like yelling loudly
74
enough to all who may be interested.” Rose focuses on the way in which
clear responsibility for a parcel of land facilitates efficient transactions, but
it is equally helpful for encouraging compliance with the obligations of
ownership.
Along with its function of aligning actual use with formal ownership,
the law of adverse possession serves as an estoppel-like settling mechanism
similar to the one I am attributing to the law of abandonment of chattels. But
adverse possession accomplishes this in a potentially messier way than abandonment, since it waits for a long period of time (typically seven to ten
years) before preventing the original owner from reasserting his interest in
75
the possessed land. The low likelihood of succeeding in a claim for adverse
possession discourages potential possessors from actually taking possession
of apparently unwanted land. The intrepid souls who do take possession risk
investing substantial resources in the unwanted property only to have the
76
original owner show up at the last moment to reassert ownership. Although
equitable doctrines may step in to prevent the most egregious injustices, the
law of adverse possession offers a far less capacious safe harbor than the
law of abandonment of chattels even where there is powerful evidence that a
landowner intended to wash her hands of her land. It is by failing to protect
subsequent possessors of derelict land (not by empowering chattel owners to

71. Walton County v. Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc., 998 So. 2d 1102, 1114 (Fla.
2008); see also Frank E. Maloney et al., Water Law and Administration § 126.1, at 386
(1968).
72.

Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 73 (1985).

73.

Id. at 79.

74.

Id. at 81.

75. See Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 415–19 (comparing abandonment with adverse possession to demonstrate why law might prohibit abandonment, but permit transfer via adverse
possession).
76. Indeed, as Strahilevitz reports, some confused courts even find evidence of an owner’s
intent to abandon his land as blocking the “adversity” (i.e., nonpermissiveness) necessary for the
adverse possession clock to even begin ticking. Id. at 415 n.232.
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unilaterally sever their ties to their property) that the law treats land dra77
matically differently from chattels.
If the state can protect against unlawful dumping on public lands, however, why would it have any trouble controlling the same behavior on behalf
of the public on terra nullius? That is, why limit the freedom of private landowners in order to influence (indirectly) behavior that the state could
simply regulate itself? The normative thrust behind this question is that, unless it is cheaper to delegate this sort of enforcement to private owners, an
interest in regulating abandonment of personal property does not provide
adequate justification for the rule prohibiting the abandonment of land.
Broadly speaking, the question presupposes that, in the absence of some
distinctive gain in efficiency, a restraint on owners’ negative liberty is undesirable. This presumption against obligation is characteristic of the sorts of
exclusion theories of property I discussed at the outset of this paper. Those
approaches make negative liberty the conceptual touchstone of property, a
starting point that leads proponents of them to treat constraints on autonomy
as exceptional situations in need of special explanation. A similar logic appears to underlie Lior Strahilevitz’s reasons for rejecting the rule against
abandoning land, at least in some circumstances:
Land differs from chattel property in three relevant respects: (a) it is immobile, (b) it cannot be destroyed, and (c) a sophisticated recording system
is already in place for land throughout the United States. Real property’s
immobility eliminates the possibility that such property will be lost or mislaid, a consequence that reduces the significance of confusion costs in the
policymaking calculus. Real property’s indestructibility mitigates the damages associated with resource decay. The presence of a recording system
means that there already exists, and long has existed, a low-tech version of
Craigslist, which might function as an effective clearinghouse for
information about abandoned real property, thereby reducing confusion
and lag-time costs . . . . In short, the unique attributes of land suggest that
the problems created by abandonment are more significant in the context
of chattels than they are in the context of real property. On this reasoning,
the rule regarding the abandonment of real property should be at least as
78
permissive as the rule regarding chattel property.

Within the framework of these presumptions, the traditional common
law rule against abandoning land is indeed hard to justify. As Strahilevitz
suggests, there are clearly some situations in which the ability freely to abandon land would enhance utility. At the same time, eliminating the rule
risks a countervailing loss of efficiency. Land that has positive market value
in the hands of its owner might become substantially less valuable if it is
abandoned and becomes derelict before a willing “taker” realizes that it is

77. This differential treatment may reflect assumptions about the low probability that a landowner will actually intend to permanently walk away from landownership. It may also reflect
outdated beliefs about the difficulty of monitoring and defending possession of real property. See
Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws 150–51 (2010).
78.

Strahilevitz, supra note 2, at 412–13.
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79

available. We can see an analogous process operating in the context of foreclosed homes where responsibility for the property is uncertain due to the
80
fractionation of mortgages through sophisticated mortgage securities.
Without an apparent owner (sometimes the banks themselves seem unsure
who is responsible for the property), the foreclosed homes fall into disrepair,
and a property that had a positive (though low) market value when in the
hands of its former owner-occupant becomes worthless, or possibly even
81
negative in value. Because of efficiency’s uncertain valence, a presumption
of autonomy unless overridden by efficiency fails to provide much by way
of a justification for the traditional common law approach to abandonment.
Efficiency and autonomy are not always so equivocal in the abandonment context. Most obviously, these values seem to line up very strongly in
the exceptional area where the common law actually does robustly protect
the right to abandon: its permissive attitude towards the abandonment of
non-possessory interests in land. Abandonment of encumbrances on possessory interests likely generates significant efficiency and autonomy gains. By
facilitating the reunification of the various strands of fee simple ownership,
it increases the freedom of owners (both of dominant and servient estates)
and enhances the alienability of land. And the abandonment of such narrowly drawn beneficial land interests does not seem to generate much by
82
way of harmful consequences for third parties.
But, looking beyond autonomy and efficiency, the narrow contours of
this exception to the common law’s overarching suspicion of abandonment
is particularly helpful in revealing the logic behind the principal rule. It
seems significant that the law freely permits the unencumbered unilateral
abandonment of land interests that are gerrymandered to include only narrow rights to benefit from someone else’s land. At the same time, however,
it expressly prohibits the abandonment of other land interests and requires
bilateral consent for the termination of servitude burdens. The narrowness of
the servitudes exception suggests that it is the presence of obligations towards others that renders the unilateral act of abandonment problematic.
Thus, broadening the discussion to include the question of obligations opens
up the possibility of a more nuanced defense of the common law’s regulation of abandonment.

79. See Restatement (Second) of Prop.: Landlord & Tenant § 12.1 cmt. i (1977)
(“Abandonment of [real] property is an invitation to vandalism . . . .”); cf. Roslyn Corenzwit Lieb et
al., Student Project, Abandonment of Residential Property in an Urban Context, 23 DePaul L. Rev.
1186, 1188 (1974) (“Once a building becomes unoccupied, it is often stripped of all but its outer
shell, leaving behind the final product of the abandonment cycle—an open, vacant and structurally
dangerous building.”); id. at 1216 (noting that a dwelling whose rehabilitation was economically
viable upon abandonment may deteriorate to such an extent over a period of two years that it is no
longer cost effective to restore it to habitability).
80. See Susan Saulny, In Foreclosure Crisis, a Rise in Banks Walking Away, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 30, 2009, at A20.
81.

See id.

82. See generally Carol M. Rose, Servitudes (Sept. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (discussing impacts on third parties as a recurring concern within servitudes law).
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I have argued elsewhere that an important aim of property law is to promote human flourishing by enforcing and encouraging certain forms of
83
virtue, including obligations to share. In a similar vein, Greg Alexander has
argued that embedded within the deep structure of American property law
84
are norms of social obligation. Fundamental to these sorts of obligationoriented approaches to ownership is the notion that affirmative duties
accompanying ownership are both pervasive and intrinsic to the common
85
law of property. And the sorts of interests that underlie the assessment of a
particular duty (or privilege) go beyond individualistic values like autonomy
(understood, as it often is, as the absence of coercion) and efficiency (under86
stood, as it often is, through the lens of preference satisfaction). They
include such collective goods as the health and stability of the community in
which a particular parcel of property is situated as well as the shared values
87
and commitments on which that health and stability depends. Such a conception of ownership, with obligation standing alongside autonomy at
property’s core, fits remarkably well with the contours of the common-law
doctrine of abandonment.
Ironically, then, the theory that the rule against abandoning land is an
outdated vestige of the feudal origins of Anglo-American land law comes
closest to unveiling the reasons for the law’s structure. That explanation
identifies the rule’s inception with the many nested obligations accompany88
ing landownership within a feudal system. Where the feudal explanation
falls short, however, is in its failure to recognize that the modern law of landownership might fruitfully continue to understand landownership as
imbued with affirmative duties. When ownership is conceived of as a social
practice permeated by obligation, all property labors under a sort of servitude for the benefit of the communities in which the property is situated. On
this view, owners’ (negative) property liberties and the (affirmative) obligations associated with ownership stand on conceptually equal footings. And,
just as the owners of servient estates cannot unilaterally walk away from the
obligations imposed by servitudes, the unilateral abandonment of property,
especially land, is equally problematic.

83.

See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 Cornell L. Rev. 821 (2009).

84. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94
Cornell L. Rev. 745, 748 (2009).
85. See Alexander, supra note 84; see also Joseph William Singer, How Property Norms
Construct the Externalities of Ownership, in Property and Community 57, 59–60 (Gregory S.
Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 2010).
86. Cf. Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 Ind. L.J. 145, 152–53 (1977–78)
(contrasting “individualist and subjectivist” conceptions of value and freedom that predominate in
contemporary economic analysis of law with conceptions—rooted in the Aristotelian tradition—that
view both value and freedom as “communal and objective”).
87. See Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of Community, 10 Theoretical Inquiries L. 127, 138–45 (2009).
88.

See Roberton, supra note 48, at 1228.
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C. The Continuing Value of the Common Law’s
Suspicion of Abandonment
Of course, the fact that exclusion approaches to property are a poor fit
with the contours of the common law of abandonment does not mean that,
normatively speaking, we ought to continue to hew to the common law’s
suspicion of abandonment. Although the purpose of my Article has been
primarily to challenge the fit between exclusion theories of property and this
corner of the common law of ownership, the common law’s treatment of
abandonment has much to be said for it. The notion of ownership reflected
in its suspicion of abandonment is admittedly out of phase with popular contemporary norms regarding both ownership in general and the behavior of
abandonment in particular. Our modern consumer culture favors disposability and transience in our relationship with property of all sorts, and so a
regime that reflects suspicion towards abandonment can seem somewhat
alien and perhaps even arbitrarily restrictive. But these consumer norms are
of relatively recent vintage; it is an open question whether they can or will
endure. Moreover, the values promoted by the common law’s restraint of
abandonment behavior, on reflection, are familiar. They are the values of
frugality and caution most of us recognize in lessons we have heard (sometimes to our irritation) from those whose characters were formed in extreme
89
hardship or perhaps simply in the days before the rise of plastic salad shoo90
ters.
The common law’s distrust of abandonment seems less alien and arbitrary if we approach it from the perspective of a community in which things
are acquired, not in anticipation of quickly throwing them away, but to be
kept and (re)used, or perhaps resold or given away. This was the nature of
people’s relationship to “stuff” through most of the history of the common
law. Historian Susan Strasser discusses the relatively recent nature of our
culture of easy acquisition and disposal in Waste and Want, her fascinating
social history of trash:
Most Americans produced little trash before the twentieth century. Packaged goods were becoming popular as the century began, but merchants
continued to sell most food, hardware and cleaning products in bulk. Their
customers practiced habits of reuse that had prevailed in agricultural communities here and abroad. Women boiled food scraps into soup or fed them
to domestic animals; chickens, especially, would eat almost anything and
89. Those who lived during the Great Depression formed habits of frugality that they retained throughout their lives. See, e.g., Charles D. Schewe et al., Defining Moments: Segmenting by
Cohorts, 9 Mktg. Mgmt. 48, 50–51 (2000). These habits were reflected in the popular culture of
that period. Laura Ingalls Wilder’s images of frugality and self-sufficiency on the American frontier,
which were written at the height of the Great Depression, “reinforced and promoted the consumption patterns that many families [at the time] were compelled to practice.” Ann Romines,
Constructing the Little House 113–14 (1997), quoted in Samantha MacBride, The Immorality
of Waste: Depression-Era Perspectives in the Digital Age, SubStance, 2008, at 71, 72–73.
90. To use a favorite example of disposable culture from The Onion. See Chinese Factory
Worker Can’t Believe the Shit He Makes for Americans, The Onion, June 15, 2005, http://
www.theonion.com/content/node/31049.
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return the favor with eggs. Durable items were passed on to people of other
classes or generations, or stored in attics or basements for later use. Objects of no use to adults became playthings for children. Broken or
worn-out things could be brought back to their makers, fixed by somebody
handy, or taken to people who specialized in repairs. And items beyond
repair might be dismantled, their parts reused or sold to junk men who sold
them to manufacturers. . . . All over the country, even middle-class people
traded rags to peddlers in exchange for tea kettles or buttons; in cities,
ragmen worked the streets, usually buying bones, paper, old iron, and bottles as well as rags. These small-time entrepreneurs sold the junk to dealers
who marketed it in turn to manufacturers. The regional, national, and even
international trade in rags was brisk because they were in high demand for
papermaking and for “shoddy,” cloth made in part from recycled fibers.
Grease and gelatine could be extracted from bones; otherwise, bones were
made into knife handles, ground for fertilizer, or burned into charcoal for
91
use in sugar refining. Bottles were generally refilled . . . .

Today, Strasser notes, “[a]t the turn of the millennium, Americans know
only a well-developed consumer culture, based on a continual influx of new
products. Many of these are designed to be used briefly and then discarded;
many are made of plastics and other materials not easily reused, repaired, or
92
returned to nature. Discarding things is taken to be a kind of freedom . . . .”
Strasser observes that “[e]conomic growth during the twentieth century has
93
been fueled by waste” and by the (relatively) new culture of disposability.
The common law’s closed-cycle conception of ownership may seem
outdated or quaint to us, inured as we are to our ephemeral relationships
with cheaply built material things. But it reflects values that have prevailed
for most of human history and that we might do well to consider carefully
before discarding.
This explanation does not, by itself, answer the question why the law
should express these values of permanence and responsibility, as well as the
underlying conception of ownership as obligation, indirectly and through the
law of land, rather than through the law of property more universally. That
question is answered in part by a repetition of my point about the way in
which the law of land qualifies the ease with which personal property can be
abandoned. Looking at the operation of the law of abandonment as a whole,
rather than piece by piece, it is simply a misunderstanding to see it as permissive with respect to chattels while restraining the abandonment of land.
It would be more accurate to say that, through its treatment of land, the
common law reflects discomfort with abandonment through and through.

91. Susan Strasser, Waste and Want: A Social History of Trash 12–13 (1999).
Strasser’s claim that garbage was not a problem before the twentieth century may be a bit overstated. For a complementary, though less rosy, view of the garbage situation in urban areas prior to
the twentieth century, see Melosi, supra note 64, at 17–18; see also Ann E. Carlson, Recycling
Norms, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1231, 1254–59 (2001).
92.

Strasser, supra note 91, at 16.

93.

Id. at 15.
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Nevertheless, there is something special about land that makes it the logical focal point for the law’s efforts to regulate owner conduct and to impart
norms of obligation. In prior work, I have discussed the features of land that
distinguish it from other owned resources as land’s “complexity” and
94
“memory.” Both of these characteristics help to explain why the common
law might employ rules governing landownership to express and inculcate
norms of obligation in the domain of abandonment. One feature of land’s
complexity derives from its status as an essential component in any human
activity that requires physical space, giving it a special relationship to
95
human beings and human communities. In Karl Polanyi’s words, land “invests man’s life with stability; it is the site of his habitation; it is a condition
96
of his physical safety; it is the landscape and the seasons.” Our actions,
including the action of abandoning a chattel, must occur in some place, and
so it is hardly surprising that the common law regulates such activity in the
97
first instance by regulating the place.
Perhaps as salient is land’s memory, which freights decisions about land
with powerful durability. Changes to the land are frequently expensive to
undo, at times even prohibitively so. Although, at least conceptually speak98
ing, land cannot be destroyed, its usefulness to human beings and to
99
ecosystems can be irreparably damaged. The supply of land is ultimately
limited. Land’s finitude amplifies the importance of land-use decisions because, all things being equal, more land put to one use leaves less land
available for another. This means that, once in place, existing land uses limit
the scope of our choices for a long time to come. Consequently, land, more
than other resources, remains the site of numerous conflicting demands,
both among human beings (including human beings who have yet to be
born) and between humans and other species.
When viewed from the standpoint of the affirmative obligations that accompany ownership, these two features of land make it a resource, decisions
about which virtually always have implications for the broader community.
In the era before the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), permitting a landowner to abandon her

94.

See Peñalver, supra note 83, at 828–32.

95. See Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L.J. 1315, 1317 (1993) (“Because
human beings are fated to live mostly on the surface of the earth, the pattern of entitlements to use
land is a central issue in social organization.”); see also John R. Logan & Harvey L. Molotch,
Urban Fortunes: The Political Economy of Place 17 (2007) (“[P]lace is indispensable; all
human activity must occur somewhere.”).
96.

Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation 178 (1944).

97. In addition, as Larissa Katz argues, landowners’ unique visibility and vulnerability to the
state also makes the indirect regulation of behavior on the land through the regulation of landowners
an effective strategy. See Katz, supra note 8, at 38–44.
98. See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 Rutgers L. Rev. 357, 360–61
(1954) (illustrating the idea that interests in land do not depend on the physical tangibility and continuation of the property); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 Yale L.J. 781, 795
(2005) (“[L]and is the only inherently perpetual form of property.”).
99.

See Peñalver, supra note 83, at 833.
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land could have had the effect of shielding her from liability for conduct
that, though not creating harmful consequences for neighbors and therefore
not remediable through nuisance, could permanently degrade her own land.
An irresponsible owner would be able to pollute her land and simply walk
away, leaving the community as a whole worse off by depriving it of the
benefits generated by the future productive use of the degraded parcel.
Similarly, in communities that rely heavily on land taxes for revenue to
fund local services, a landowner who is permitted to walk away increases
incrementally the burden on the remaining taxpayers, who must raise their
100
own contributions in order fully to cover the community’s expenditures.
And a landowner who abandons a home leaves behind a parcel that, left unattended, can quickly become a blight for his former neighbors. To avoid
suffering the consequences, neighbors would be forced to assume the basic
maintenance that the landowner would previously have been obligated to
101
perform.
Private land law is an imperfect means of promoting norms of stewardship and securing the performance of owners’ obligations. For example,
rather than encouraging owners to dispose of their unwanted chattels in an
orderly way, it might instead simply encourage them unilaterally to destroy
the unwanted chattel on their own land. The “burn barrel” has long been a
common way to dispose of garbage, particularly in rural areas where trash
102
collection service is not always readily available. Nuisance law has traditionally placed some limits on the destruction of unwanted property,
103
especially where it occurs on a large scale. But, unassisted by modern environmental regulation, the common law leaves significant room for the
104
destruction of property as an alternative to abandonment or conveyance.
The owner of unwanted chattels will predictably opt for the path of least
resistance among conveying, abandoning, and destroying unwanted property. So a legal rule that makes abandonment more difficult might, under the
right circumstances, encourage destruction. But it will not always do so.
Destroying property takes effort. Moreover, to the extent that, normatively
speaking, the destruction of property is undesirable, the answer is to make
destruction harder, not—barring reasons to favor abandonment over conveyances—to make abandonment more convenient. Modern environmental

100. This would not be the case if the property in question consumed more services than it
contributed in property taxes. Presumably, however, the temptation to abandon would be strongest
when the opposite is true.
101. E.g., Maureen Milford, Foreclosures become forgotten burdens in neighborhoods, USA
Today, June 10, 2008, at 5A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/economy/housing/200806-09-Foreclosure-upkeep_N.htm?loc=interstitialskip.
102. See, e.g., Michael Hill, Rural residents oppose burn ban, Albany Times Union, Aug.
12, 2008, at A3, available at http://www.timesunion.com/AspStories/story.asp?newsdate=
11/17/2009&navigation=nextprior&category=STATE&storyID=711074. In the past, waste disposal
facilities have often burned garbage as well. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Vill. of Viola, 227 N.W.2d 55 (Wis.
1975).
103.

See, e.g., Kellogg, 227 N.W.2d 55.

104.

See generally Strahilevitz, supra note 98.
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statutes increasingly impose just such restrictions on the right to destroy.
New York, for example, recently prohibited the open burning of trash—
105
including in burn barrels—throughout the state.
It is true that the doctrine prohibiting the abandonment of land predates
zoning codes and solid waste permits. Though these and other modern legal
tools for regulating landowner behavior do not completely obviate the value
of a rule prohibiting owners from simply walking away from their land,
their presence substantially mitigates the consequences of liberalizing the
common law’s treatment of abandonment. In the modern context, abandonment is already so hemmed in on all sides by public law that the common
law rule arguably becomes redundant.
On the other hand, there are reasons to favor retaining the common law
rule, the overlapping regulatory alternatives and supplements notwithstanding. For starters, the existence of modern regulatory structures is a doubleedged sword. While they reduce the practical need for the common law’s
suspicion towards abandonment, they also significantly reduce the costs of
retaining the rules that follow from that suspicion. At the same time, the
gentleness of the common law’s restriction of abandonment reaffirms its
deep respect for individual autonomy and reduces the cost (in terms of restraints on owner autonomy) of retaining the rule. The rule’s force is also
tempered by the ease with which it is satisfied under normal circumstances.
The owner of a chattel who wants to part with it need only find someone
who wants it or, alternatively, a landowner who is, consistent with his own
duties of landownership, willing to accept the chattel for disposal. Similarly,
although an owner may not simply walk away from the duties he owes the
land, he can substitute himself merely by finding someone willing to step
into his shoes as the land’s owner. Finally, the regulation of abandonment
through landowner oversight constitutes a decentralized system for regulating abandonment within the outer limits set by the public and private law.
This approach is consonant with a commitment to individual freedom
that—while far from its sole preoccupation—is nonetheless characteristic of
Anglo-American property law.
Indeed, so mild is the common law rule that its survival has not done
much to hamper the rise of the disposable culture that Strasser describes in
her history of trash. That culture has been hugely enabled by the state’s decision, as the owner of its own land or through its agents in the solid waste
industry, to open the doors to cheap and easy disposal of unwanted chattels.
In other words, eliminating the common law rule against abandoning land
has not been a necessary condition for the rise of our contemporary culture
of disposal.
But, as the state’s facilitation of easy disposal suggests, retaining the
role the common law envisions for landowners in the abandonment process,
may (and in some ways, already has begun to) simplify the task of changing
course and shifting towards a renewal of the values of recycling and reuse
that predominated before the rise of disposability. As Strasser describes, for
105.

See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 6, § 215.2 (2007).
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example, solid waste companies have been able to leverage their strategic
power over trash disposal to facilitate the dissemination of norms favoring
recycling, helping to bring these into the mainstream of American consumer
106
culture. If the operator of a local landfill insists on the separation of recyclables, users typically will not have many alternatives to compliance. And
the habit of separating recyclables, even when initiated as a result of landfill
owner’s coercion, might, over time, lead to an internalization of broader
107
environmental norms.
Conclusion
The interpretation of the law of abandonment that I have proposed in
this essay understands its prohibition of the abandonment of land as the
foundation, rather than the exception, to the common law’s treatment of abandonment as a whole. Far from constituting an anachronistic anomaly, the
rule helps to shed light on the common law’s conception of ownership more
generally, and of landownership in particular. Contemporary accounts frequently treat the duties of ownership as negative in nature. Owners are
obligated to avoid taking affirmative actions that harm others but are free to
retreat into the cocoon of their property, where they can escape from outside
interference. This conception of “property as exit” is normatively unappealing, but, at least in the context of abandonment law, it is also descriptively
inaccurate. Within the common law tradition, property ownership is imbued
with obligations that bind us to others in the community where the property
is situated. The law of abandonment, considered as a unified system for regulating the disposal of property, both reflects and helps to realize this
vision of the responsibilities of ownership.

106. See Strasser, supra note 91, at 284–85 (discussing how solid waste companies have
been able to disseminate an ethic of recycling).
107. This admittedly speculative suggestion finds some support in Daryl Bem’s “selfperception” theory, which posits that people draw conclusions about the nature of their own beliefs
and attitudes in part by observing their own behavior, just as we make inferences about others’ attitudes by observing their conduct. See Daryl J. Bem, Self-Perception Theory, in 6 Advances in
Experimental Social Psychology 2 (Leonard Berkowitz ed. 1972). The idea is that being convinced to engage in recycling behavior might lead recyclers to come to see themselves as an
“environmentalists,” at least in some sense or to a greater degree than before having engaged in that
behavior. And, having formed this self-perception, the person enters a “virtuous escalator” whereby
she becomes more likely to support other environmental initiatives. See John Thøgersen & Tom
Crompton, Simple and Painless? The Limitations of Spillover in Environmental Campaigning, 32 J.
Consum. Pol’y. 141, 147 (2009) (“[I]f an individual recycles their refuse, this action in itself may
lead them to think of themselves as the kind of person ‘who cares for the environment.’ They may
therefore be left more positively predisposed to other pro-environmental behaviors.”); see also All
Things Considered: How Consumers Can Affect Climate Change, (NPR radio broadcast Dec. 8,
2009), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121216180 (transcript)
(Professor Michael Vandenbergh stated in the interview, “[T]he little bit of research that’s available
suggests that people, when they do something good for the environment, don’t do less other good
things. And, in fact, there are a number of psychological phenomena that suggests that we might
actually induce more support for behavior change. When someone becomes committed to a certain
behavior, they’re more likely to follow through in other areas as well.”).
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